Luftwaffe Night Fighting Tactics

German Air Defense Techniques for Interception of RAF Night Bombers

Jun 25, 2008

Radar detection and tracking technologies aided Luftwaffe pilots in their effort to control the night skies above Europe during Britain's night bombing offensive.

When the British strategic bombing offensive against continental Europe commenced in May of 1940, the Luftwaffe had relatively few assets available to counter the threat. German air defense commanders were confident that banks of searchlights surrounding major cities would be capable of locating and illuminating attacking bombers, allowing flak batteries to target and destroy them.

As a result, only eight Freya detection radars were deployed along the coast of the North Sea and but a single night fighter unit was operational, equipped with less than 50 aircraft. Additionally, no formal command and control apparatus existed to process the radar data and dispatch interceptors. It was quickly determined that these measures were woefully inadequate and improvements were necessary.

The Kammhuber Line

In October of 1940, Generalmajor Josef Kammhuber was appointed General of Night Fighters. He tightened the German air defenses by fielding additional searchlights, augmented with acoustic locators, in a belt (the Kammhuber Line) that covered the approaches into Germany over Dutch and Belgian airspace. Kammhuber also increased the amount of ground control radars along the inbound routes. The radar sites consisted of three components, one Freya detection unit and two Wurzburg tracking radars.

The Freya unit would identify targets at long distance (100 miles maximum) and then pass it on to one of the Wurzburg units when it came within range (40 miles). The second Wurzburg would follow the dispatched night fighter, creating an accurate plot that allowed ground controllers to guide the pilot to interception.

Night fighters could engage the British bombers in advance of their target objectives, decreasing the chances of being hit by friendly anti-aircraft fire.

The RAF's introduction of the "Window" radar countermeasure in July 1943 compelled the Germans to alter their methods. Luftwaffe Major Hajo Herrmann proposed a different night interception approach, dubbed "Wilde Sau". Herrmann’s concept concentrated Luftwaffe interceptors high above targeted cities, where pilots could spot British bombers silhouetted against the fires burning below. Flak crews were instructed to fuse their shells to detonate below the night fighters patrol altitude. Upon visual sighting, the interceptor pilot would dive into the bomber formation and begin his attack.

The "Zahme Sau" tactic placed night fighters over a stationary electronic beacon where the pilots would orbit and await direction towards RAF bomber streams by ground controllers via radio. Once an intercepting aircraft was among the British formation, it would begin transmission of a signal that other interceptors could home in on and join the attack.

Aggressors, Volume 3: Interceptor vs. Heavy Bomber, David A. Anderton, Zokeisha Publications, 1991

The copyright of the article Luftwaffe Night Fighting Tactics in WW II History is owned by Andrew C. Rappold. Permission to republish Luftwaffe Night Fighting Tactics in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.