Canadian history is full of stories of military successes and failures, but no battle so glaring as the ill-fated Dieppe Raid of 1942. On August 19th of that year, a force of roughly 4,500 Canadian soldiers, 900 British Royal Marines, and 50 U.S. Rangers participated in Operation Jubilee, a raid on the French Port of Dieppe. The main objectives of the raid were to destroy enemy defenses, and fuel depots, to steal any German documents, and capture prisoners.
However, none of these major objectives were accomplished that day, leading many historians and authors to label Jubilee as an “unmitigated disaster.” However, despite the apparent failure of Jubilee, the Dieppe raid was vital to the success of a much larger, and ultimately more important battle: the D-Day landings of June 6th, 1944 and the subsequent Allied invasion of France.
Why Dieppe?
The planners decided to attack the Port-town of Dieppe because, “Dieppe’s proximity would permit the attacking force to cross the [English] Channel almost entirely under the cover of darkness, and is an excellent port with good rail and road communications, and an airfield nearby made it ideal as a prospective target for full-scale invasion.”
Naval Support in Dieppe
In order to aid the attacking infantry, who attacked from the sea aboard small landing craft, the Royal Navy sent several ‘Hunt-Class’ destroyers to bombard the coastal defenses during the raid. However, these ships only carried 4-inch deck guns, which were insufficient to destroy the heavily-defended German coastal guns that were in place at Dieppe.
The Allies did not send a battleship with sufficient fire power to destroy these gun batteries because Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound was scared of losing his mightiest weapon, battleships, to a potential air-attack by the German Luftwaffe, and his response to the request for battleships was; “Battleships, by daylight, off the French coast? You must be mad?” This lack of heavy naval bombardment was detrimental to the success of the landing soldiers.
Air Support in Dieppe
A second failure by the British planners was the absence of any heavy bombers to suppress German defensive positions. At a crucial planning meeting for the raid on June 5th, Commander Leigh-Mallory expressed concern that “night bombing would only serve to alert the Germans” and thus eliminate the necessary element of surprise.
Furthermore, Commander Roberts supported the abandonment of bombing because he felt that “indiscriminate bombing would hamper the movement of his tanks through the streets.” So, the decision was made to abandon the bombing. In place of heavy bombers, there would be strikes at dawn against the beach by cannon-firing fighters.
Timing of the Dieppe Raid
A third challenge that faced the vessels in the fleet was timing their attack in the early-morning light; “fifteen minutes late at any of the five main points of attack would mean disaster, not only in that local area but for the whole operation.” As Captains wrestled with the darkness in the hours leading up to the attack, and the obligatory radio silence, precious minutes were lost.
Once in position, many ships realized they were actually in the wrong position, and more time was lost trying to correct their mistakes. The result was that during the assault, the Sappers (demolition experts) and most of the tanks were 10-15 minutes late to land on the beach, leaving the ill fated first-wave of infantry with “no armoured support and no help from Sappers in punching through the beach obstacles.”
Lessons Learned in Dieppe
These lessons were used on D-Day and included; the use of massive aerial bombing attack prior to the main assault, designed to demoralize the enemy and destroy many enemy defenses. After the Navy’s failure at Dieppe, the amphibious landing for D-Day was practiced countless times, with two pre-D-Day landing exercises which had to be absolutely perfect.
As well, battle ships carrying 15-inch guns, cruisers carrying 5-6 inch guns, and destroyers firing 4-inch guns all provided heavy fire support, and paratroopers and glider troops from the 6th British Airborne Division (including the 1st Canadian Paratroop Battalion) landed in the early morning hours of D-Day to capture vital bridges and destroy several gun emplacements overlooking the beach.
The D-Day planners also learned it was more important to rely on heavy fire support rather then on the element of surprise; this is exemplified by the fact that at Dieppe, there was virtually no artillery used to support soldiers due to their cumbersome nature which would slow down the assault. However, on D-Day soldiers utilized artillery and rockets extensively once they reached the beaches.
Furthermore, at Dieppe many of the landing craft were actually made of wood, which offered little or no protection when enemy machine-gun fire raked their landing boats. On D-Day, infantry were transported in more-heavily armoured landing craft.
Aftermath of Dieppe
Following D-Day, General Eisenhower stated that “Except for Dieppe […] we would have been lacking much of the special equipment and much of the knowledge needed for the [D-Day] invasion.” Without the experience of Dieppe, where many Canadian soldiers lost their lives, the ultimate success of D-Day would have been put in jeopardy, and the losses that day would have been even higher.
Sources:
Franks, Norman L.R. The Greatest Air Battle; Dieppe, 19th August 1942. William Kimber, London; 1979.
Ford, Ken. Dieppe 1942; Combined Operations Catastrophe. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Great Britain; 2003.
Hunter, T. Murray. Canada at Dieppe. Balmuir Book Publishing Ltd., Canada; 1982.
Thompson, R.W. Dieppe at Dawn; The story of the Dieppe Raid 19 August 1942. White Lion Publishers Ltd., London; 1972.
Whitaker, Brigadier General Denis. Dieppe; Tragedy to Triumph. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Whitby; 1992.
